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This paper investigates quality assurance in Chinese higher education by looking at the 
Evaluation of the University Baccalaureate Programmes Project (EUBPP) conducted in China. 
It analyses factors that bring about tensions between policy and practice in this area through 
a study of two contrasting tertiary institutions. The results show that the aims of the EUBPP 
have been partly achieved through the interaction of policy-making and implementation. In the 
process, contextual factors connected to institutional status and stages of development have 
led to varying degrees of tension between policy and practices.
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Introduction
In recent decades, policy and practices in higher education around the world have been strongly 
influenced by neoliberal ideology. Neoliberalism envisages opening up world markets and 
developing the role of the private sector in political and economic affairs, including sectors 
such as education (Adamson et al., 2012). Varghese (2012) suggests that there are a number 
of drivers behind these changes in higher education: the desire to enhance national economic 
competitiveness; the need to expand higher education to allow access for a greater proportion 
of the population; the impacts of geopolitical changes and the forces of globalization on student 
mobility; the emergence of higher education as a marketable commodity; and the imperative for 
higher education institutions to find funding from sources other than the state. The notion of 
higher education as a business has resulted in the importation of various practices related to 
efficiency, accountability, and quality assurance.
The world trend shows that tertiary institutions can no longer take their values and 
privileges for granted (Massy, 2003). Under the significant pressure of the ‘convergent effect 
of financial restrictions, rising expectations and social demand, mandates of new economy, and 
weakening symbolic capital’ (Amaral et al., 2003: 131), higher education is experiencing ‘the 
erosion of trust’ in terms of the quality of education being provided (Massy, 2003: 3). To enhance 
the quality of tertiary institutions – and to respond to the pressures of global competition, the 
requirements of economic growth, and the calls for inspection from diverse stakeholders – many 
countries have introduced various types of quality-assurance mechanisms (Lewis, 2009; Vidovich, 
2004; Westerheijden, 2003). Quality assurance has been emphasized not only in industrialized 
countries but also in less developed nations, such as India, Thailand, and Indonesia (Bray, 1996; 
UNESCO, 2006; Yavaprabhas, 2008).
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In many countries, quality-assurance systems have a systematic and far-reaching approach to 
ensure that universities have efficient mechanisms for assessment and improvement (Harman, 
1998b; Harvey and Williams, 2010). One important approach is the external evaluation of 
institutional processes and performance, in which the control of central government over 
higher education is strengthened. Several studies have explored the critical issue of tension 
between managerialism and the academic profession (e.g. Trow, 1994; Massy, 2003). In addition, 
Perellon (2007) indicated that understanding policy involves two dimensions: the ideational and 
the material. The ideational dimension refers to the set of cognitive values and norms that 
underpin the production of policies. The material dimension is the implementation of the policy 
that includes the methods and tools used, the procedures and approaches adopted, and other 
concrete actions.
Since the end of the last century, China has promulgated a series of policies to stimulate 
the development of higher education. In this process, provincial government and universities 
gained much more freedom to make their own decisions in order to cater more efficiently to 
the needs of a highly competitive market. China has experienced a dramatic expansion of higher 
education since 1999 – enrolment increased from 9.8 per cent in 1998 to 26.5 per cent in 2010 
(Ministry of Education, 2011) – and faces the same challenges as other countries in maintaining 
or improving the quality of higher education with limited resources. Additionally, systematic 
criteria to be followed by administrations within the higher education system had, until recently, 
gone largely unenforced (Li et al., 2008: 13). In order to strengthen governmental control over 
quality assurance, the Chinese Ministry of Education (MOE) initiated the Evaluation of University 
Baccalaureate Programmes Project (EUBPP)1 in 2002. Prior to the unveiling of the EUBPP, some 
evaluation-related work had already been carried out. For example, in 1985, the government 
conducted an evaluation of guidelines within the schools of engineering as part of a trial run. 
This was followed by the ‘Draft Regulation of Higher Education Institution Evaluation’ (MOE, 
1990). In 1994, China started three evaluation programmes: the University Evaluation Standards 
Project, Exemplary Evaluation, and Random Evaluation (HEEC, 2004). In 2002, China integrated 
these three evaluations into what eventually became the EUBPP. Between 2002 and 2008, 609 
institutions underwent this evaluation. The MOE has established three main goals for the EUBPP 
(MOE, 2005):
1. To enhance the level of macro-administration and direction on higher education given 
by the national government.
2. To encourage education departments at all levels (for example, provincial level and 
municipal level) to support tertiary institutions in various aspects of their teaching.
3. To provide clarity regarding the way forward for institutions so that they may: 
improve managerial conditions by increasing fiscal investments; strengthen educational 
infrastructure and deepen education reforms; and stimulate development by clarifying 
development plans, improving teaching conditions, strengthening the quality of teaching 
staff, developing management skills, and gradually establishing internal quality assurance 
mechanisms.
Central government designed criteria to evaluate each institution based on uniform standards. 
The criteria include eight basic aspects: institution mission, quality of staff, facility and utilization, 
subject construction and curriculum reform, teaching administration, style of study, teaching 
effect, and special items. These 8 aspects are further extended to 19 sub-standards and 44 
observation points, covering nearly every facet of teaching and instruction. Some of these aspects 
are easier to measure with accuracy than others. Taking the observation point ‘the numbers and 
construction of frontline teachers’ as an example, the university would be graded A if teachers 
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holding postgraduate degrees occupied over 50 per cent of all frontline teaching posts, and C if 
the number were between 30 and 40 per cent. Quantification and grading here is straightforward. 
However some observation points, such as ‘institution mission’ and ‘style of study’, are not so 
easily quantifiable and the grading mainly depends on the judgment of government-appointed 
on-site experts.
The EUBPP encompasses three stages: the first, ‘self-review’, stresses the institutions’ need 
to scrutinize themselves according to the evaluation criteria and to submit self-evaluation 
reports to the on-site experts. Following these submissions, on-site experts inspect the self-
reports according to the standard criteria. The second stage is an on-site visit. About a dozen 
experts go to the university and listen to the university leaders’ presentation of their self-review, 
and then inspect various aspects of instruction, utilizing a range of different approaches. This 
process lasts for four or five days, after which the inspectors will give a brief report to the 
institution, including initial evaluation results and some suggestions on future development. After 
that, the ‘central expert committee’ – the on-site experts selected by government to make the 
final decision on evaluation grade – considers some related impact factors, such as university 
history, geographical factors, and the type of tertiary institution, and publishes a final evaluation 
grade. The third stage is aimed at improvement. The university makes improvement plans based 
on the evaluation report, and then moves to implement those plans in a logical and efficient 
fashion. An implementation report of improvement must then be submitted about one year after 
the evaluation.
Although some researchers have studied the effects of the first round of EUBPP (e.g. Li et 
al., 2008; Zou et al., 2012), the multiple perspectives involved in this evaluation – especially the 
perspectives of institutional administrators and frontline teachers, as well as their complicated 
relationship during this evaluation – have not yet been fully explored. Spillane and his colleagues 
(2002) emphasize that understanding the personal cognitive dimension can contribute to our 
understanding of the evolving process of educational policy and its concomitant challenges and 
issues. They also argue that the key aspect of how agents make sense of reforms has seldom 
been explored in western research. Honig (2009: 333) further states that the outcomes of a 
policy ‘depend on interactions between that policy, people who matter to its implementation, 
and conditions in the place in which people operate’. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on the 
implementation and adaptation of the external evaluation mechanism in higher institutions, as 
well as the multiple perspectives and complex reactions of diverse stakeholders in China.
The study
The description above shows that the EUBPP is a large-scale, comprehensive evaluation for 
tertiary institutions in mainland China. To explore the authentic opinions and feelings of the 
participants thoroughly, this paper adopts complementary qualitative methods such as document 
analysis and semi-structured interviews. The data were collected from 2009 to 2010 in a developed 
coastal province in eastern China. Partly because of its location and traditional culture, the 
province ranks highly in national statistics for both economic development and education (Wu 
and Li, 2002). The province has a number of prestigious, top-tier universities with a long history, 
in addition to a range of other types of tertiary institutions, such as technical colleges. Finding 
one or two examples that can typically represent each type is unrealistic. Therefore, two strongly 
contrasting universities in terms of student academic achievement (higher and lower), history 
(longer and shorter), and features (comprehensive university – one offering social sciences and 
natural sciences – and professional institution) were selected within the province.
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University A, as one of China’s key comprehensive universities, has a long history. During 
its development, University A has received financial support from both the government and 
the general public. University A is renowned for providing good facilities for both teaching and 
research work. Currently, the student body in University A numbers over 43,000. As a whole, 
University A is representative of top-level tertiary institutions in China.
University B is a key provincial university co-established by the Chinese Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and the Provincial People's Government. The first 
undergraduates were enrolled in the early 1990s. University B developed rapidly with engineering, 
information technology, and telecommunications being the main subjects offered. Statistics in 
October 2010 showed that University B had fewer than 20,000 students. Generally, in terms of 
quality, University B belongs to the middle-to-bottom level of tertiary institutions in China.
Formal research interviews were conducted in these two universities with staff members 
that included school-level administrators, department-level administrators, and frontline teachers. 
The interviewees were employed in various departments and had a wide range of academic 
responsibilities. Information about each interviewee is summarized in Table 1. Given that the 
faculty is the basic unit for evaluation in EUBPP, most informants in this study were administrators 
at the university and faculty levels. Each interview was conducted in a private space within the 
respective university, lasted at least one hour, and focused on eliciting interviewees’ opinions 
and feelings about the external evaluation. Constrained by restricted research time, the size and 
scale of data collection were limited. However, the selection of various informants with disparate 
backgrounds facilitated a multi-layered understanding of decision-making and quality-assurance 
adaptation. In addition, frontline teachers and staff were also selected and interviewed for data 
triangulation. The major interview questions were as follows:
• What did you/your department/your university do in the EUBPP?
• What were your feelings about the EUBPP?
• How do you evaluate the impacts of the EUBPP? Why?
Table 1: Information about the interviewees
Institution-
Interviewee
Gender Department Position
A-1 M Teaching affairs office Director
A-2 M Quality control office Director
A-3 M English language and literature Dean
A-4 M Educational administration Professor
B-1 F Quality control office Director
B-2 M Teaching affairs office Vice-Director
B-3 M Economy Dean
B-4 M Teaching affairs office Staff
The interview data were transcribed and analysed inductively. Following the study by Perellon 
(2007), the categories and issues were identified during data analysis. In 2007, Perellon posed five 
fundamental questions, as follows:
1. Objectives: What should be the aims and objectives of the quality-assurance policy?
2. Control: Who should control the process of quality assurance?
3. Areas: What are the domains covered by the quality-assurance procedures?
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4. Procedures: How are the quality-assurance procedures established?
5. Uses: How will the collected information be used?
Although these five questions were designed to compare quality-assurance policies, they also 
assist our understanding of EUBPP implementation. Based on Perellon’s theory, we divided the 
EUBPP process into five aspects. In the first round of coding, following the stages of familiarization, 
the interview data were initially divided into categories on the basis of these five key questions. In 
the second round of coding, repetitive key phrases and issues within each aspect were underlined. 
The data were further analysed by highlighting the similarities and differences between University 
A and University B. By triangulating related data, such as self-reports or interview data, pertinent 
quotations were selected, translated into English, and double-checked by researchers.
Findings
Objectives of the EUBPP
The interviewees from the two universities basically agreed that the government’s purpose 
in initiating the EUBPP was formative and the evaluation was mainly designed for further 
improvement and development:
There are too many problems that need to be solved in higher education. That is why MOE 
introduced this programme. They want to stimulate the improvement mechanisms and encourage 
tertiary institutions to face their problems as soon as possible. (A-1)
To tell the truth, we didn’t know how to manage an institution before … I think that is why central 
government conducted the EUBPP. To some extent, they want to give us criteria to facilitate our 
management. (B-1)
With regard to the acceptance of the EUBPP, the reactions of the interviewees differed from 
one university to the other. The Director of the Teaching Affairs Office and frontline teachers at 
University A told us that, to some extent, they felt that they were forced to conduct the EUBPP:
To some extent, this round of evaluation requires you to do it even though you don’t want to. 
We all share the pressure stemming from being obliged to be evaluated externally and get an 
outcome of excellent performance. (A-1)
Frankly speaking, our university doesn’t need to have that evaluation. We are at the top level in 
China! It is ridiculous that the institutions like ours need to undergo the evaluation. (A-3)
Conversely, University B’s reaction was more enthusiastic. As a developing institution, University 
B wanted to use the EUBPP as a means to strengthen its management system and expand its 
campus:
Our institution has developed very fast recently so that our management systems couldn’t cope 
with the demands of the increasing development. The EUBPP gives us an opportunity to reflect, 
design, and implement a more systematic and efficient quality-assurance mechanism. (B-1)
Without the EUBPP, we couldn’t expand our campus so efficiently. Because of the criteria of the 
EUBPP, we had to speed up the construction of our new campus to a year for the inspection. It 
was amazing! From this point of view, our previous goals for campus extension were successfully 
completed under the pressure of the EUBPP. (B-2)
University A felt that the criteria and requirements of the EUBPP did not match their developed 
status. The external evaluation brought nothing positive to the institution; on the contrary, it 
had a negative impact on their plans for innovation. Therefore, the motivation of University 
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A to participate in the evaluation was mainly to finish the task. In addition, as one of the most 
prestigious universities in China, it would be unacceptable if the university failed to achieve 
a ranking of anything but ‘excellent’. Thus University A’s aim in undergoing the EUBPP was 
summative. In comparison, the objectives of University B integrated formative and summative 
aims, as improvements in management systems and campus facilities could be embedded in 
preparations for the EUBPP. This process fitted the government’s (stated) formative purposes 
very well. In addition, University B saw a summative dimension in that they had been classified as 
‘unacceptable’ in the previous evaluation, so undergoing the EUBPP gave them an opportunity to 
demonstrate their improved quality and development.
Although the teaching function of universities was highlighted in government documents, the 
promotion of teaching innovations and enhancement of teaching quality proved comparatively 
difficult to measure. Hence, this aspect was not emphasized by middle managers or frontline 
teachers in their reflections on the EUBPP.
Controlling agencies of the EUBPP
Perellon (2007) stated that two main bodies could be identified from previous evaluation 
experiences: political authorities on the one hand, and higher education institutions on the other. 
Although these two might in theory be seen as polar opposites, to a substantial extent they have 
to interact and work together in the implementation of any quality assurance scheme.
Central government
On paper, the central government designed the EUBPP as a formative measure to facilitate 
innovation and improvement in higher education, and the evaluation is not the ultimate goal 
in itself. However, poor evaluation results can bring negative consequences for the future 
development of an institution. Normally, institutions that undergo the EUBPP review are classified 
under one of four categories: excellent, good, acceptable, and unacceptable. The MOE (2007) 
stipulated that the intake of new students should be limited or suspended for those institutions 
that received a rating of ‘unacceptable’. In addition, these institutions could not establish new 
degree programmes, could not apply for the certification to authorize Masters or Doctoral 
degrees, and could not apply for permits to construct vital laboratory facilities. For these reasons, 
the MOE can, to some extent, be said also to have adopted a summative approach with the 
introduction of the EUBPP, thereby placing it in a dominant role in the relationship with the 
institutions under review.
Input of experts
The on-site experts are scholars in various fields, including university presidents as well as 
academic experts. They are invited and assigned to be on-site experts by central government and 
have an intermediate role between the political and the academic agencies. However, they were 
not always regarded by university staff as fit for the role. One administrator from University A 
was sceptical about their capabilities – a view shared by other administrators in the university.
I personally think that you cannot say these experts have a problem about their level of quality. 
However, they have no professional training and they are not suitable for undertaking such a job. 
The Ministry of Education is aware of this issue and so only the team leaders receive training. Still, 
whether the training really works is another question because, when they [the team leaders] go 
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to Beijing, they only listen to some speeches from the Ministers and the secretary experts, and 
read the documents on the evaluation system. (A-1)
Such scepticism makes it difficult for the experts’ recommendations to be considered deeply or 
implemented after the inspection. From this point of view, the control powers of these experts 
were more formal than substantial in the evaluation of University A. On the other hand, the 
suggestions of external experts were welcomed and accepted in University B. A director from 
University B said: ‘These experts understand what we really need. They give us many pertinent 
suggestions which have been integrated into our development plan for the next ten years’. It can 
be seen that the extent of acceptance of experts’ opinions depends on the perception of the 
external inspectors’ understanding of the institution and their related knowledge and capabilities.
Tertiary institutions
In both universities, the people in positions of responsibility took the EUBPP seriously 
because of the implications of the evaluation results for future development opportunities. In 
both institutions, a special office for preparing for the EUBPP was established, chaired by the 
university’s president or vice-president and filled with administrators charged with organizing 
the preparations. At the department level, corresponding evaluation offices were also established 
to work in collaboration with the university-level office.
University A treated the audit as a one-off event. The new Evaluation Office was staffed by 
personnel from the Teaching Affairs Office and the Quality Control Office. After the EUBPP, the 
Evaluation Office was disbanded, as its function was solely to cater to the requirements of the 
audit. The situation was different in University B. Before the EUBPP, there was no specialized office 
in charge of quality control. In order to prepare for the evaluation, some middle-level managers 
and staff were drafted to form an evaluation office chaired by the university president. They 
adapted the university’s development orientation, enhanced the teaching facilities, constructed 
an evaluation system, and improved quality assurance with regard to the requirements of the 
EUBPP. After the inspection, the evaluation office remained in place to deal with issues of quality 
control. An interviewee stated that:
We want to grasp this opportunity. There are some problems in our management. If we want 
to get better and better, we need to consider how to resolve these problems. Preparing for the 
EUBPP was a priority for all of us. This was not only because of the external pressure, but also 
because of the internal requirements. Now, we find that our university really has changed a lot 
after the EUBPP. The evaluation engineers our development in a more stable and faster way. (B-1)
From this point of view, University B embraced the developmental opportunities afforded by the 
EUBPP, while University A eschewed them.
Inspection areas of the EUBPP
Although the EUBPP was intended to be quite comprehensive in scope, some aspects such 
as class visits, staff-to-student ratio, proposals for student training, and student assessment 
were specifically highlighted as problematic by on-site experts and the universities’ local 
administrators. Two indicators elicited an especially high number of concerns. First, experts 
stressed the difficulties created by standardization of documents (including examination papers 
and graduate theses). Many managers and teachers worked very hard to meet the demands of 
this standardization. As a result, the inspection of such documents was frequently criticized by 
local administrators as well as frontline teachers.
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The winter vacation in 2008 was used to make up the documents. We went to every department 
and checked the examination scripts. We discovered the errors and corrected teachers’ mistakes 
in marking and asked both the graduate students and department officers to look at the scripts 
again. After re-marking the scripts, we asked the teachers concerned to change the marks and 
sign off on them accordingly. (A-2)
For marking, this question carries ten marks. A student gets 8 marks and has 2 marks deducted. 
On the left, it is required to write +8 marks with a circle and –2 marks with a circle on the right 
… If there is a change in the marks, you have to sign on the paper and change the overall marks 
and sign again. This is too formalized. (A-1)
Although I know that the aim of the evaluation is to help us construct an effective managerial 
system, compiling documents and students’ test papers is difficult and time-consuming. We have 
spent a long time preparing. We bought all these bookcases and folders to sort out the paper 
work. (B-3)
Second, due to their easy-to-quantify nature, the construction of an aesthetically pleasing 
environment and the purchase of research facilities tended to become the focal point of review.
I dare to say that if the MOE had not conducted this evaluation, many universities would not have 
been able to build new school campuses. The MOE’s evaluation has its own requirements and 
standards and so, for universities to comply with these standards, they had to borrow money to 
build student hostels. (B-2)
Evaluation procedures of the EUBPP
From the empirical data, it appears that some institutions added extra stages to the three-
stage model envisaged by the MOE’s Higher Education Evaluation Centre (HEEC). First, most 
institutions conducted a pre-evaluation to make sure that they could achieve a satisfactory grade 
in the formal evaluation. The pre-evaluation, which was conducted by the provincial education 
bureau or by the university itself, involved a number of external experts who had been involved 
in the inspection of other institutions. To ensure that the pre-evaluation stage was as authentic as 
possible, the duration and procedure of the trial inspection were exactly the same as the formal 
inspection.
Preparing for the pre-evaluation is more nerve-wracking than the actual evaluation. It is because 
you employ experts to find out your own weaknesses. These experts are involved in teaching 
and they easily detect and focus on the problem areas. In fact after the pre-evaluation, the actual 
evaluation is more relaxed. (B-4)
In practice, due to the limited time available, evaluation experts and local administrators paid 
more attention to objective products (such as hardware, facilities, paper documents, and so on) 
than the more time-consuming and difficult-to-quantify formative processes.
They (evaluation experts) put too much attention on the details, especially on paper document 
inspection. Let me give you an example: it was a statutory requirement for teachers to write the 
students’ scores in a specific location when marking exam papers. It was unacceptable if teachers 
wrote the score in the wrong location. Furthermore, teachers needed to draw a circle around 
the score. You know, teachers always have their own style when they grade students’ papers. We 
had to amend them all one by one. Although the workload was huge for all of us, we had to do 
it painstakingly. (A-2)
The on-site visit lasted no more than six days, making it impossible – in the view of university 
administrators – for the evaluation experts to gain sufficient information about the instruction 
and management in a university.
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Uses of the EUBPP data
It was noted above that, although EUBPP was designed to be formative, it also serves a summative 
function. In University A, the formative function was questioned by administrators.
Sometimes I think: is the evaluation a scientific one? What will such an evaluation bring to the 
university? Well, the panel will comment on issues which the university will follow up … If they 
take five days to give advice on the university’s plans for the next ten or thirty years, is it possible 
for them to do a good job? ... The panel may feel that we should do this and we should not do 
that … The university has to make revisions in accordance with their advice. Can they really give 
a comprehensive review? It is problematic. (A-1)
University B proactively integrated the external evaluation with their own desire for improvement 
and innovation. The suggestions advanced by on-site experts were taken seriously. From this point 
of view, the use of inspection results in University B was consistent with the policy intentions. 
Furthermore, the impact of the evaluation outcomes went beyond governmental expectation as 
they were closely associated with personal career development.
To tell the truth, the EUBPP also helps us select middle-level managers. Have you talked with 
teacher C? He was a teacher in the Department of Finance and Banking. Because he did a good 
job during the preparations for the EUBPP, he was promoted to Vice-Director of the university’s 
Teaching Affairs Office. Personal capabilities were put under the microscope during this process. 
After the EUBPP, many personnel changes took place. (B-4)
The implementation of EUBPP thus brought about some unintended outcomes in University B.
Discussion
Harvey (2004) states that accreditation in higher education leads to a fundamental shift of power 
from educators to managers and bureaucrats. In a reflection on various countries and districts, 
Harvey and Williams (2010) state that tension clearly exists between quality assurance as a 
bureaucratic and administrative challenge and the improvement of academic quality. As discussed, 
in this round of evaluation, the Chinese government intended to promote both organizational 
quality and educational quality. To achieve the first goal, the evaluation was designed to improve 
the administration of tertiary institutions at the national level as well as the administrative 
mechanism at the school level. To achieve the second goal, the evaluation was conducted to 
continue enhancing academic endeavours. Even though these two goals are intertwined, the 
tensions between them still exist (Zou et al., 2012). For universities such as University A, which 
already had a mature mechanism for ensuring educational quality, the external evaluation was 
perceived as an administrative burden rather than an impetus for educational improvement. 
Moreover, several flaws in this round of evaluation, such as the overemphasis on standardized 
papers and on the provision of a pleasing environment, may have disturbed the original process 
of improving academic quality in University A. There had been a number of large-scale discussions 
on educational philosophy and comprehensive development at University A since the 1990s. The 
developmental orientation and university culture were gradually transformed and strengthened 
during this process. In 2006, University A established conceptual foundations for instructional 
reform in the succeeding stage. However, the implementation of the reform was deferred because 
of the ongoing preparation for the EUBPP. After the external inspection, the previous reform 
plan was found to emphasize fundamental changes of curriculum orientation and curriculum 
plan reframing, while the transformation from teacher-centred to student-centred pedagogy had 
largely been carried out. The reform subsequently became widely recognized, gained acceptance, 
and obtained fruitful outcomes at University A.
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For University B, which is a newly built university with an incomplete administrative system, 
the external evaluation undoubtedly served as a stimulus that strengthened organizational 
quality. After the EUBPP, the evaluation office, as an administrative unit, was retained and assigned 
full responsibility for assessing curriculum and instruction at University B. Furthermore, in 2011, 
University B extended its evaluation mechanism to two levels, namely, institutional and faculty 
dimensions, with a view to precisely and effectively controlling instructional quality. However, on 
the basis of the research data, it is difficult to conclude that the external evaluation substantially 
improved the quality of curriculum and instruction in University B. Thus, the self-proclaimed goal 
of the EUBPP to improve both organizational quality and educational quality is questionable.
A worldwide trend towards decentralization in governance has been identified (Rondinelli 
et al., 1983), and the Chinese government attempted to integrate this approach into this round 
of evaluation. The HEEC claimed that informing institutions about their own developmental 
orientations and improving the quality of management and education would be a key feature 
of the process. However, as Levin (1997: 260) noted, ‘decentralization practices appear very 
little different than the supposedly more centralized approaches they have supplanted’, and 
many western studies have echoed this statement (e.g., Harman 1998a; Hoecht 2006; Mollis and 
Marginson 2002). Similar results have also been observed in this study. The central government 
actually strengthened the control of tertiary institutions by predetermining the controlling 
agency, inspection focus, and evaluation methods. Institutions were expected to respond to the 
broad guidelines of the EUBPP. In addition, compared with other countries and districts, the 
Chinese government adopted a relatively ‘hard’ approach with regard to the implementation 
of the EUBPP. One comparative example is informative. Most western countries do not grade 
institutions after a critical evaluation (Lewis 2009). In China, the central government not only gives 
final grades to universities, but also makes the grades known to the public. As in other countries, 
this external audit approach is influenced by the ideology of accountability and neoliberalism, 
but it may also be closely connected to the history of higher education in China. From the 
time of the Sui Dynasty (581–618 CE) right up to the Revolution of 1911, higher education 
was headed by the Guozijian: the top institution in higher education as well as the agency that 
managed the education system throughout the empire. The Guozijian was a typical representative 
of the mechanism of ‘academic centralization or nationalization’ (Zha, 2011: 461) and it served 
to strengthen the linkage between state management and higher education. In modern times, the 
acquisition and application of knowledge in higher education has become a key part of national 
efforts to achieve China’s goals for economic development. Consequently, the government views 
higher education as a critical driver of the country’s development and pays close attention to its 
performance (MOE, 2011. Thus, ‘state control seems to have always had a place, and nowadays it 
is still evident under the guise of something that we might identify as academic centralization or 
nationalization’ (Zha, 2011: 462).
Local agencies have also had a considerable influence on the design of the EUBPP. This might 
be explained with reference to Confucianism in China. In the west, academic freedom and the 
search for impartial knowledge is part of the intellectual tradition of higher education. However, 
Chinese scholars, influenced by Confucianism, have, historically, attempted to realize their ideals 
through action, and have had direct responsibility for managing the state (Zha, 2011). In China, 
‘knowledge was less a matter of understanding the world than of changing it and scholars 
were expected to cultivate the self, regulate the family, govern the state, and make the whole 
kingdom tranquil and happy’ (Zha, 2011: 459). Consequently, in terms of the EUBPP, the opinions 
of local agencies or scholars received respectful attention and some were adopted by central 
government. For example, in the early days of the EUBPP, the fact that different types of tertiary 
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institutes were evaluated with the same fixed criteria came in for criticism, and the government 
responded by adapting the evaluation criteria to make the EUBPP more flexible (MOE, 2006).
Marginson and Rhoades (2002) point out that policy analysis should attend to policy 
implementation at various levels, and there is a need to take the local contexts and practices 
into account. Marsh and Huberman (1984) distinguish between ‘superordinate’ (central decision-
making) and ‘subordinate’ (local implementing) agencies in policy implementation. Lai Auyeung 
(1994) adds a further layer, ‘intermediate’ agencies, responsible for providing expert advice and 
also for channelling ideas from the subordinate agencies to the superordinate agencies, to inform 
the decision-making process. The HEEC and Secretariat for Expert Commission of the EUBPP 
could be regarded as superordinate agencies as they were responsible for organization and 
possessed decision-making powers. In contrast, the presidents of tertiary institutions could be 
seen as subordinate agencies as they were expected to implement the governmental policy 
decisions of the EUBPP. Meanwhile, the evaluation experts could be viewed as intermediate 
agents in that they influenced central government’s final evaluation. Their role was powerful 
in that their focus on such features as standardization of documentation and an aesthetically 
pleasing environment meant that these features were over-emphasized by tertiary institutions 
at the expense of the whole set of criteria. However, the relationship between the agencies 
did not always involve the top-down transmission of a central decision. From the study, it can 
be seen that some presidents, such as those at University B, took this opportunity to improve 
the management system and engineer further development, while those at University A gave a 
perfunctory response to this policy. From this perspective, the scope, depth, and duration of the 
EUBPP’s impact were profoundly influenced by the respective presidents’ conceptions of the 
EUBPP and their coping strategies.
In terms of contextual factors, the academic level and the stage of development of the 
particular institution are important in explaining the differences in response to the implementation 
of the EUBPP. If the university were at the top level and had developed its own mature system for 
management and quality control, the EUBPP offered little incentive to effect change or innovation. 
In fact, the EUBPP could be viewed as counter-productive, as preparing for the inspection might 
hamper the original pace of innovation. This was the case with University A, which had planned 
to introduce some changes to the student learning process, but the plan had to be postponed 
because of the EUBPP. However, if a particular university had previously been less academically 
successful and failed to implement necessary changes, as was the case with University B, the 
EUBPP, with its comprehensive criteria and strict grading system, could compel the institution 
to make improvements.
Conclusions
In China, tertiary institutions can be classified into categories such as comprehensive, teacher 
education, and specialist (such as agricultural) tertiary institutions. These institutions can also 
be categorized into four types: research-oriented, profession-oriented, application-oriented, and 
technique-oriented. Given the patently different features of these institutions, their kaleidoscopic 
responses to the EUBPP may be considered logical and reasonable. For example, while all the 
institutions have to be evaluated according to the same indicators regulated by the central 
government, a multitude of universities, especially non-comprehensive ones, complained about 
the inappropriateness of being evaluated under the same criteria (Lee et al., 2012). Meanwhile, 
this study has noted that several common issues faced by various institutions – the proficiency 
of on-site experts, the central control of the EUBPP, the preferences of inspection – have 
evolved during the process, leading to tensions between policy-making and implementation. The 
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outcomes of this study show that there is a considerable gap between the policy intention of 
the EUBPP on the one hand and the actual objectives – controlling agencies, inspecting areas, 
evaluation procedures, uses of the evaluation data – on the other. Within the Chinese higher 
education system, it is clear that some key agencies at all three levels (superordinate, intermediate, 
and subordinate), such as the responsible organizations, evaluation experts, and institutional 
presidents, combined with contextual factors, considerably influence the implementation of the 
EUBPP.
In 2010, the Chinese government issued the Development Plan Outline for Medium- and Long-
Term Education Innovation and Development (2010–2020) in which it announced that instructional 
quality and teaching reform in higher education will continue to be implemented (MOE, 2010). 
The MOE initiated the second round of evaluations in December 2013 and a large-scale audit of 
higher education in 2014. Important lessons for policy-makers can be learnt from the first round, 
such as discovering how one can maintain the delicate balance between external governance and 
internal autonomy regarding quality control, or finding the relationship between other countries’ 
successful experiences and their own educational and cultural tradition.
Future research
As with any research, this study has limitations. The first is the choice of province, which is at the 
top level of education in China. Considering the tremendous variation among Chinese higher 
education, scholars may aim to explore more cases in different locations for an increasingly 
holistic picture. The second limitation is the short research time, which restricted the size and 
scale of the sample selection. Future research can endeavour to examine the effects of the 
EUBPP from two approaches. The first approach would be a longitudinal study to obtain a more 
in-depth understanding, while the second approach could involve a broader selection of tertiary 
institutions that may depict a more comprehensive picture of the relationship between the EUBPP 
and the development of higher education in China. Such endeavours would be worthwhile, as 
the introduction of quality-assurance mechanisms within higher education systems remains a 
challenge.
Note
1. The phrase ‘Baccalaureate Programmes’ used here refers to programmes for undergraduate students.
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